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ABSTRACT 
Encouraged by the creation of the Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation within the U.S. 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in 1984 and 
the Commercial Space Act of 1998, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) now 
relies on an extensive network of support from 
commercial companies and organizations. At NASA’s 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), this collaboration 
opens competitive opportunities for launch providers, 
including repurposing underutilized Shuttle Program 
resources, constructing new facilities, and utilizing 
center services and laboratories. The resulting multi-
user spaceport fosters diverse activity, though it 
engenders risk from hazards associated with various 
spaceflight processing activities. The KSC Safety & 
Mission Assurance (S&MA) Directorate, in 
coordination with the center’s Spaceport Integration 
and Center Planning & Development organizations, 
has developed a novel approach to protect NASA’s 
workforce, critical assets, and the public from 
hazardous, space-related activity associated with 
KSC’s multi-user spaceport. 
 
For NASA KSC S&MA, the transformation to a multi-
user spaceport required implementing methods to 
foster safe and successful commercial activity while 
resolving challenges involving: 
 
• Retirement of the Space Shuttle program 
• Co-location of multiple NASA programs 
• Relationships between the NASA programs 
• Complex relationships between NASA programs and 
commercial partner operations in exclusive-use 
facilities 
• Complex relationships between NASA programs and 
commercial partner operations in shared-use 
facilities 
 
NASA KSC S&MA challenges were met with long-
term planning and solutions involving cooperation 
with the Spaceport Integration and Services 
Directorate. This directorate is responsible for 
managing active commercial partnerships with 
customer advocacy and services management, 
providing a dedicated and consistent level of support 
to a wide array of commercial operations. This paper 
explores these solutions, their relevance to the current 
commercial space industry, and the challenges that 
continue to drive improvement with a focus on areas 
of safety management and risk assessment that have 
been crucial in KSC’s evolution into a multi-user 
spaceport. These solutions may be useful to 
government entities and private companies looking to 
partner with the commercial space industry. 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
The realm of outer space, from low-earth-orbit to 
extraterrestrial bodies and beyond, is always viewed 
with great potential, and national pursuit of these 
endeavors spurs both technical and economic growth.  
In the United States (US), the road to promote a 
commercial space industry was shaped by national 
policy as well as the high risk of the activity.  The 
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, and 
subsequent creation of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), declared that this 
civilian agency will exercise control of aeronautical 
and space activities, but could enter into cooperative 
agreements with other entities to conduct its work [1].  
The US Space Program historically was a joint 
undertaking of the federal government and private 
industry, but this relationship principally existed 
through the use of commercial contractors for 
federally managed programs.  An increased presence 
of commercially produced vehicles and satellites 
through NASA’s first few decades led to renewed 
interest in enabling commercial space enterprise.  The 
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Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 recognized the 
contributions of private industry, and declared that the 
United States should encourage private sector 
launches [2].  The Act directed NASA and the United 
States to promote entrepreneurial activity in space, and 
facilitate the use of government-developed technology 
to encourage the private sector.  This act created the 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation within the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and 
subsequent NASA Authorization Acts saw similar 
language incorporated to promote private sector 
launches. 
1.1 Kennedy Space Center  
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC), located on Merritt 
Island, FL, serves as NASA’s primary launch center 
for its spaceflight programs.  Containing over 140,000 
acres of land, KSC has the capabilities to support 
transportation via land, air, rail, sea, and space.  The 
location of KSC on the Eastern Seaboard allows for 
multiple launch capabilities, including horizontal and 
vertical, human-rated and unmanned launch vehicles.  
The KSC organizational structure is composed of 
multiple directorates, which provide planning and 
implementation services for ground operations and 
spaceflight programs.  These programs manage and 
share a unique infrastructure of processing facilities, 
launch pads, testing facilities, and laboratories.  KSC 
assets are utilized by multiple NASA programs and 
contractors, and mostly recently, commercial partners.  
The KSC Institution supports these programs by 
providing and managing the essential functions of the 
center.  Among these organizations, the Spaceport 
Integration and Services directorate integrates and 
manages center services and customer support to 
spaceport users.  KSC’s Safety & Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) Directorate sustains and strengthens the 
success of KSC’s organizational structure, serving as 
an independent and value-added partner ensuring the 
mission success of programs while protecting the 
safety and health of the public, program team 
members, and those assets that the US entrusts to 
NASA [3].   
From concept development, to production, to 
operation and retirement, the lifecycle of many 
programs existed at KSC.  The last major program 
lifecycle to reach retirement, the Space Shuttle 
program, left KSC with not only excess real and 
personal property capacity, but a large amount of 
legacy procedures and processes to maintain.  The 
center, and S&MA sought to consolidate the legacy 
documentation from the Space Shuttle program. 
S&MA as an organization originated within the 
program and engineering directorates, reporting 
directly to program management and providing safety 
engineering services to the center.  NASA reassessed 
this model after the tragedies of Space Shuttle 
Challenger, and Space Shuttle Columbia.  The Rogers 
Commission Report, investigating the Challenger 
accident, and the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board noted that independent authority did not exist to 
manage technical requirements that addressed hazards 
[4, 5].  NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission 
Assurance realigned to provide independent Technical 
Authority to each center’s safety organization.  This 
Technical Authority allows the KSC S&MA 
organization to perform independent assessment of 
NASA activity, and manage programmatic and 
institutional risks for the hazards of a government-
managed spaceport.     
The Space Shuttle program remained the largest 
NASA program on KSC for several decades, up until 
the final launch of STS-135 in July 2011.  The 
presence of purely commercial work at KSC had been 
historically small, in comparison to the sizeable 
NASA contractor workforce and amount of center 
resources and infrastructure.  External partnerships, 
both domestic and international, have increased in the 
last three decades.  In 1998, NASA introduced the 
Launch Services Program to procure launch vehicle 
services from commercial providers.  Although these 
providers launched federal payloads with NASA 
oversight, the launch provider managed a larger 
portion of risk, with NASA safety and quality 
participating in the reviews.  The International Space 
Station program brought international partners and 
payloads to KSC’s Space Station Processing Facility, 
where S&MA provided safety oversight for both civil 
servant, contractor, and international partner 
workforces.  Throughout all of these efforts, NASA 
retained the primary responsibility for operations and 
processing activities.  KSC also increased partnerships 
with academic research, prominently in the center’s 
Space Life Sciences Laboratory.  NASA had dedicated 
the bulk of the center’s facilities, services, and 
workforce to the successful completion of the Space 
Shuttle program’s mission.   
1.2 Multi-User Spaceport 
The transition and retirement of the Space Shuttle 
program freed up a number of assets at KSC 
previously utilized by the Shuttle processing and 
launch flows.  NASA’s current manned exploration 
vehicle, the Space Launch System, will be processed 
and launched from KSC.  KSC determined that the 
facilities and services required for current and future 
NASA programs left many existing assets 
underutilized or mothballed.  Maintaining these 
facilities and services at their previous capacity would 
result in excess cost to the government. A strategic 
goal in NASA’s 2007 Strategic Plan was to, 
“encourage the pursuit of appropriate partnerships 
with the emerging commercial space sector.” [6] A 
solution, therefore, was to partner with non-NASA 
entities, including federal, state, commercial and 
academic organizations, to make use of these assets. 
The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 identified KSC 
as a multi-user launch complex, for both government 
and commercial programs [7].  NASA sought 
commercial partners through both open solicitation for 
NASA partnerships, and by public announcements of 
available facilities.  NASA made certain facilities 
available for exclusive-use including the Launch 
Complex 39A, the Orbiter Processing Facilities, 
Shuttle Landing Facility, Hypergolic Maintenance 
Facility, and others, and also proposed sharing space 
within active NASA facilities, including the Vehicle 
Assembly Building, Launch Control Center and 
laboratories. 
2. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
This concept for a space center with multiple users 
required a thorough review of existing requirements to 
determine how commercial launch activity would be 
incorporated.  Within S&MA, this started with general 
institutional safety requirements.  The basis for the 
NASA Safety programs, at an agency level, is defined 
in the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 
document NPR 8715.3 NASA General Safety 
Program Requirements.  This document implements a 
comprehensive safety program that defines 
institutional, program, system, operational, training, 
and discipline-specific safety programs [8].  
Referenced NASA standards and technical 
requirements included explosives safety, pressure 
vessels, lifting devices and equipment, lightning 
safety, personal protective equipment, and other 
occupational safety policies (industrial health and fire 
protection, while referenced in the NPR, are 
maintained under separate documents at the center 
level).  This document provides a framework for 
NASA centers to detail specific requirements for their 
center.  At KSC, these further requirements are 
addressed via the KSC Procedural Requirements 
(KNPR) 8715.3 document.  This KNPR addresses the 
governing requirements and demonstrates how KSC 
implements the NASA Safety program and NASA 
Safety standards at KSC [9].  The document applies to 
all entities, including civil servants, contractors, and 
visitors, that operate at KSC. 
S&MA developed the KNPR as a catch-all to safety 
programs and practices on the center.  KSC S&MA 
was concerned that these NASA requirements could 
be burdensome to companies looking to conduct 
business at KSC.  KSC previously developed S&MA 
requirements to accommodate large-scale federal 
programs.  Industrial safety requirements in several 
areas exceeded those specified by the US 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
(OSHA), and other standards such as the Safety 
Standard for Explosives are supplemental to existing 
federal requirements.  Many commercial companies 
interested in partnerships maintain existing safety & 
health programs.  KSC did not intend to supplant these 
existing safety programs and introduce strain in 
complying with a new set of requirements.  S&MA 
needed to understand how to bring these safety & 
health programs under the umbrella of KSC’s existing 
safety culture.  Multiple safety and health programs 
would need to operate in harmony, with NASA’s 
safety program acting as the final authority if required.  
NASA sought to fully understand and define an 
acceptable level of risk from commercial activity to 
NASA personnel and programs.  The S&MA 
organization formulated two questions to guide 
development of a solution to this problem.  First, what 
are the minimum necessary requirements to develop 
an acceptable risk profile for commercial activity?  
Secondly, what facets of the safety program must be 
universally standard on center?   
 
2.1 Evolving Rationale 
To develop a framework for a minimum set of NASA 
requirements, the KSC S&MA organization looked 
externally to find rationale.  If general industry 
operated within the boundaries of the center, then KSC 
would have to understand general industry.  A key 
facet of how OSHA interprets fault among multiple 
parties in the same location is by its Multiple 
Employer Citation Policy [10].  In the event of an 
accident that involves multiple organizations, OSHA 
distinguishes these employers into four categories: 
creating, controlling, correcting, and exposing 
employers.  The creating employer introduces the 
source of the hazard, the controlling employer 
manages the hazard, the correcting employer mitigates 
the hazard, and the exposing employer has employees 
that could be harmed by the hazard.  This is useful in 
determining responsibility in an incident, however the 
citation policy only engages once the accident has 
occurred.  It is prudent for a worksite manager to 
ensure hazards are appropriately controlled in order to 
prevent such a mishap from occurring.  This 
categorization of employers still provided a useful 
framework to understand how NASA wanted to 
position itself as a spaceport manager.  Considerations 
included how NASA or partners introduced hazards to 
the center, how hazards are controlled and mitigated, 
and how respective employees might be exposed to 
those hazards.  To address the question of minimum 
necessary requirements, S&MA considered NASA to 
be an exposing employer.  According to the OSHA 
policy, in the event of a mishap an employer can be 
cited if it, “knew of the hazardous condition or failed 
to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the 
condition.” [10] KSC requirements on agreements 
with commercial partners would reflect due diligence 
by S&MA to understand local hazards, and through 
coordination with a partner, work to control them. 
Hazard communication between NASA, partners, the 
public, and other participants of the multi-user 
spaceport is a strong component of KSC’s S&MA 
policy.  Communication and coordination alone does 
not satisfy the principles of NPR 8715.3 with regards 
to risk evaluation and acceptance.  Safety policy must 
withstand the rigors of hazards specific to aerospace, 
including launch and reentry activities.  The NPR 
states that NASA will, “ensure the conduct of 
assessments of quantitative and qualitative safety risks 
to people, property, or equipment, and include 
recommendations to either reduce the risks or accept 
them.” [8] This is flowed down to the KNPR 8715.3 
in the assessment section, under Chapter 4: 
Operational Requirements.  Chapter 4 requires that 
organizations on KSC establish a process to review 
and accept risks, perform an assessment to evaluate 
hazards associated with operations, and establish 
controls for the hazards [9].  This applies to NASA as 
the sole employer identifying, assessing, and 
controlling its own risks.  In assessing a third party, 
and without the full complement of NASA 
requirements, the government would have to be 
judicious in how it collected information through an 
agreement.  The solution was to pare down the 
requirements of KNPR 8715.3 to the minimum safety 
standards necessary to regulate activity on center, 
while bolstering the capabilities of the operational 
assessment that identifies hazard controls.   
2.2 Operational Assessment 
The core of this new multi-use safety policy is 
NASA’s operational assessment, derived from the 
original Chapter 4 in KNPR 8715.3.  NASA’s ability 
to control and manage hazards is only as strong as its 
ability to have information available for assessment of 
the existing hazards.  As a baseline, NASA maintains 
the final authority to mitigate a hazard, should partner-
managed controls not be sufficient to reduce the risk 
to KSC personnel or property.  At the same time, 
NASA wants partners to keep their safety programs 
and requirements intact, and acknowledges different 
approaches in safety.  A commercial partner already 
must comply with all federal, state and local 
requirements, including OSHA and other incorporated 
standards, by operating in the United States.  NASA is 
not responsible for enforcing a commercial company’s 
compliance to OSHA and other laws as they pertain to 
the company’s own employees.  Rather than levy the 
full slate of KSC requirements on a partner, a partner 
could demonstrate that their safety programs represent 
an equivalent level of safety to NASA requirements 
that either exceed federal laws or target specific 
aerospace hazards.  This equivalence would be 
assessed against the risk to KSC personnel and activity 
governed by NASA.  The more partner documentation 
and data NASA could review, the better NASA could 
understand gaps between partner and NASA safety 
requirements.  A complete review of a partner’s 
business and company documentation would require 
significant time and resources on behalf of both 
parties, and might impose an undue burden on 
companies wishing to conduct operations.  NASA 
would have to be judicious in its selection of material 
to review, while ensuring appropriate breadth to 
adequately assess risk. 
The modification of the operational assessment began 
with specifying particular documents that NASA 
required prior to a partner initiating operations.  The 
first of these is a partner’s concept of operations, 
which defines the full extent, at a high-level, of all 
proposed activity.  The partner has discretion on what 
form this concept of operations takes, and could 
originate from an existing document or as a new 
product.  Acknowledging partner recommendations, 
NASA retains the authority to ask for further 
information or depth for a full assessment.  Along with 
a concept of operations, partners would include a 
description of all hazards associated with those 
operations, and the corresponding controls or 
mitigations for those hazards.  This is meant to be 
encapsulating language that included activity covering 
launch processing and ground operations.  General 
hazards include occupational hazards to personnel, 
pressurized systems, hazardous chemicals, ordnance, 
critical lifting, and others to be identified by the 
partner.  The partner would also report all hazardous 
chemicals so that KSC could catalogue existing 
chemicals on center and ensure compliance with 
NASA’s Safety Standard for Explosives [11].  To 
prevent cataloguing insignificant quantities, chemicals 
identified as hazardous by the OSHA General Industry 
Hazard Communication standard served to 
encapsulate the information NASA sought [12].  With 
this information as a basis, NASA could begin to craft 
a complete story of the proposed activity and the 
hazards brought on KSC property.  Further 
requirements would address specific highly hazardous 
activity, including high-pressure operations, ordnance, 
and range operations, but these would be tailored from 
the existing NASA standards.  Any coordination on 
this information would need to begin well in advance 
of operations, to ensure no delays in NASA receiving 
the relevant information. 
3.1 The Safety Requirement Volumes 
Once NASA S&MA understood the hazards posed by 
a partner’s operations, it was necessary to ensure those 
operations were compatible amongst existing center 
programs.  The concept of operations document 
includes information on all locations utilized by the 
partner at KSC.  The locations made available for 
commercial use fell into two categories: facilities 
whose operation, maintenance, and usage are fully 
transferred to a partner; and shared areas within 
existing NASA-controlled facilities.  At facilities 
operated and maintained by a partner, designated 
exclusive-use, NASA would have flexibility to allow 
partner safety programs to manage the facility, 
provided NASA had full awareness of these policies 
and deemed them compatible with existing facility 
policies.  Facilities designated for exclusive-use also 
contained NASA systems that fed through or 
originated within those facilities, traces of the former 
Shuttle program facility architecture.  These facilities 
would require routine access from KSC personnel for 
maintenance or inspection, and KSC S&MA needed 
oversight of safety controls at these sites.  Within a 
NASA-controlled facility or shared-use, NASA 
maintains existing security, safety, and scheduling 
procedures to be complied with by all occupants, 
including partners.    Assessing each agreement and 
each facility to tailor the KNPR 8715.3 would be a 
laborious process, as each facility had unique 
attributes and infrastructure designed to support flight 
hardware processing.  S&MA decided to take the 
original KNPR and split it into three volumes: the 
existing document relabeled Volume 1 for civil 
servants and contractors, a new Volume 2 for partners 
within shared-use or NASA managed facilities, and 
Volume 3 for partners within exclusive-use facilities.  
These individual volumes could be placed within an 
agreement, and accommodate a majority of safety 
provisions and concerns, with additional tailoring as 
needed to accommodate the specific needs of a 
partnership. 
3. SURVEILLANCE AND VERIFICATION  
The information gathered from the operational 
assessment of Volumes 2 and 3 provides the 
foundation of KSC’s risk assessment of partners, but 
NASA must perform its own due diligence to ensure 
the information is accurate and complete.  NASA 
develops a surveillance plan for each agreement to 
assess the partner’s compliance to S&MA 
requirements in the agreement.  These agreement 
requirements largely come from Volumes 2 or 3, since 
these documents are intended to exist on a majority of 
agreements.  The plans document which requirements 
are targeted, and how often KSC S&MA performs 
surveillance.  S&MA decided that to reduce the burden 
on partners and manage the resources of KSC S&MA, 
the surveillance frequency would only be performed 
on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis.  The 
frequency is based on current KSC construction 
surveillance practices, and S&MA constantly 
reassesses the frequency of evaluation.  Whether a 
contractor or partner has a satisfactory record of 
compliance or not, the evaluator may increase or 
decrease the surveillance frequency.   
Surveillance of KSC S&MA partnership requirements 
falls into two general types: documentation reviews, 
and site visits.  Documentation reviews occur early in 
the partnership process, and initially reference the 
documents requested in the operational assessment.  
At a minimum this includes a review of the concept of 
operations, hazard and chemical lists, and a copy of 
the partner’s safety & health plan (or program), but 
may also include operational or design documentation 
and risk analysis.  These reviews provide both NASA 
and the partner with a baseline of activities associated 
with ground and flight operational schedules, safety 
policies and surveillance activity over the life of the 
agreement.  It also provides sufficient lead time should 
a particular activity require additional controls or 
coordination with NASA.  Generally, these reviews 
are conducted once, at the inception of the partnership, 
but will be subsequently reviewed as updates are 
available.  These are particularly critical for flight 
safety analyses developed for commercial launches, 
since NASA may perform a review in addition to those 
required by range regulators.  The second type, site 
visits, are the best opportunities to verify that the 
information in the documentation is current and 
adequate.  Site visits are precoordinated with the 
partner on a non-interference basis, and surveillance is 
only performed on requirements identified in the 
agreement or associated KNPR 8715.3 Volume.  Stop-
work authority, a critical item in KSC’s safety culture 
that allows personnel to call a halt to immediate unsafe 
activity, is always explicitly clear for any activity.   
4. SPACEPORT INTEGRATION 
The usefulness of surveillance relies on close 
coordination with NASA partnership management, 
which lies within two key center organizations.  
S&MA maintains relationships with KSC managers 
and stakeholders of partnerships for awareness of any 
concerns with regards to safety requirements and 
policies.  To understand how these relationships are 
maintained, it is important to describe how KSC 
realigned its structure to better support the multi-user 
spaceport concept.  The Center Planning and 
Development directorate leads the development of 
partnership agreements at KSC, and thus is 
responsible for early partner coordination, 
negotiations, and ensuring the development of an 
executable and enforceable agreement which includes 
all relevant safety requirements.   The management of 
the multi-user spaceport, and the liaisons to partner 
operations fall under the responsibility of the 
Spaceport Integration and Services Directorate. 
The Spaceport Integration and Services directorate is 
responsible for the overall planning and assimilation 
of Kennedy Space Center processing activities and the 
execution of center services across NASA projects and 
programs, other government agencies, and 
commercial partners. These functions are integrated to 
create consistently safe, innovative, responsive, and 
cost-effective solutions, driving the success of all 
spaceport customers. The primary goal of the 
directorate is to ensure that the institutional needs of 
all spaceport customers, including NASA programs 
and commercial partners, are met. This is done by 
providing a consolidated operations and scheduling 
function for the center which includes developing and 
maintaining a top-level operations master schedule 
that integrates commercial and government entities 
operating at KSC to ensure awareness and 
deconfliction of hazardous and other operations that 
have potential impact across the customer base.  
The directorate also provides customer liaisons to 
customers of the KSC spaceport for the purposes of 
identifying, coordinating, deconflicting, scheduling, 
and managing KSC spaceport services. These 
customer liaisons interface directly with partners on a 
daily basis to develop and communicate requirements, 
identify creative solutions to issues, and integrate 
between the various users and stakeholders of the 
spaceport (including S&MA). These liaisons also 
manage and implement the process for partners to 
procure services from KSC, facilitate approval for any 
customer-proposed modifications, and coordinate 
customers’ requests with KSC implementing 
organizations to provide a viable support plan to the 
customer. 
Through close partnership with Spaceport Integration 
and Services, S&MA is able to maintain a good 
understanding of the nature of operations occurring at 
KSC, the level of interaction between spaceport users 
and their operations, and the types of issues being 
faced by the customers. This partnership is critical to 
helping both organizations be successful and in 
ensuring that the spaceport enables the safe and 
successful operations of all government and 
commercial activity. 
4.1 KSC Technical Integration 
In addition to working with stakeholders from other 
directorates at KSC for agreement development and 
implementation, S&MA also retains institutional and 
programmatic safety, quality, and reliability experts 
within its organization.  During the early stages of 
agreement development, the subject matter experts 
(SMEs) are consulted for specific requirements on 
activities that are expected to be highly sensitive or 
highly hazardous, including: program schedules, 
explosive siting, lifting device, pressure vessel and 
range safety priorities.  During agreement 
implementation, NASA KSC SMEs are available for 
interpretations of technical safety standards and 
program safety priorities.  They also assist in the 
development of targeted surveillance activity for their 
disciplines. 
5.0 COMMERCIAL LAUNCH PROVIDERS 
The authority of KSC safety requirements also 
required reevaluation for commercial launches 
licensed by the FAA.  For NASA-managed or 
procured launches, safety analysis is performed under 
existing cooperative agreements with its neighbor, the 
Air Force’s 45th Space Wing.  The Webb-McNamara 
Agreement, established in 1963 to minimize the 
duplication of responsibilities from both NASA and 
Air Force launch operations, drove this cooperation 
[13].  However, Webb-McNamara did not account for 
purely commercial launches, and the review and 
licensing of launch providers by the FAA therefore 
creates another regulatory entity.  A review in 2013 by 
the NASA Executive Council determined that for 
FAA-licensed launches, safety reviews could be 
conducted by the 45th Space-Wing or an FAA-
approved entity.  This creates more options for 
commercial providers, but moves away from the 
traditional NASA model for safety review and 
concurrence.   
The flight safety analysis required in the application 
for an FAA launch license is reviewed by the FAA.  
With the FAA maintaining the licensing authority, 
NASA does not have mandated approval of a launch, 
as the FAA ensures protection of the public.  As the 
manager of the spaceport where this launch activity 
would occur, though, NASA still holds a fundamental 
responsibility for protecting personnel and property.  
Using the previous risk-based approach from the 
Operational Assessment in the KNPR Volumes, 
NASA will request and review a minimum set of data 
from the flight safety analysis for assurance that risk is 
minimized.  If the risk to NASA facilities exceeds 
criteria established in the NPR 8715.5A Range Flight 
Safety Program, NASA will work with the launch 
provider to better quantify or control the risk [14].  
Likewise, processing and ground safety operations 
will be conducted according to the shared or 
exclusive-use facility requirements in KNPR 8715.3 
Volumes 2 and 3, respectively.  The ability to review 
data, request information, and implement controls 
through these document Volumes allows any risk-
based safety concerns, regardless of origin, to be 
covered by the KNPR requirements.  Even in 
situations where NASA does not have immediate 
approval authority, NASA must manage the risk to its 
spaceport.  Through coordination and levying prudent 
requirements, NASA will fully understand launch 
hazards and ensure the risk is acceptable to the center.  
KSC stakeholders and S&MA will work with 
commercial launch providers to identify controls and 
modifications that will allow them to successfully 
execute an FAA-licensed launch. 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
The multi-user spaceport concept invites new 
perspectives, novel engineering, and cutting-edge 
technologies to the KSC.  The success of commercial 
partnerships, and NASA missions, hinges on 
cooperation and shared awareness.  This awareness is 
the core of both KSC’s Spaceport Integration and 
Services policies and S&MA safety policies that 
govern the risks and challenges inherent to the multi-
user concept.  Strong and suitable policies allow KSC 
to support a wide variety of partnerships without any 
compromise to NASA KSC’s safety culture 
The center accepts the new risks associated with 
commercial launch activity, and has adapted its 
structure, and requirements, to better promote these 
partnerships.  In enabling the multi-user spaceport, 
KSC also addresses its mission as levied in the 
NASA’s Space Act to foster an environment for 
commercial space access.  As this access to space will 
always offer great rewards at great risk, it is the 
S&MA organization’s continued mission to provide a 
framework that allows these goals to be safely 
attained.   
 
7.0 REFERENCES 
1. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. 
L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426-438 (Jul. 29, 1958), NASA 
History Program Office  
2. Commercial Space Launch Act of 1998 (Previously 
Commercial Space Launch act of 1984), Title II – P.L. 
105-303, Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
Legislation & Policies  
3. KDP-B-1041 Rev. G, John F. Kennedy Space 
Center Business Operating and Agreement for Safety 
and Mission Assurance Directorate, Nov. 12, 2015, 
NASA 
 
4. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space 
Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rogers Commission 
Report), June 6, 1986, Washington DC, NASA 
History Program Office 
 
5. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, 
August 2003, NASA History Program Office 
 
6. NASAFY 2007 Performance Highlights, Feb. 1, 
2008, NASA 
 
7. NASA Authorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
267, 124 State. 2805 (Oct. 11, 2010), NASA.GOV 
 
8. NPR 8715.3C (change 9) NASA General Safety 
Program Requirements, Feb. 08, 2013, NASA 
 
9. KNPR 8715.3 Rev. J-1 KSC Safety Procedural 
Requirements, June 28, 2012, NASA 
10. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) Instruction, Multi-Employer Citation Policy, 
CPL 02-00-124, Dec. 12, 1999, US Department of 
Labor 
11.  NASA-STD 8719.12 (change 2) Safety Standard 
for Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics, 
December 12, 2011, NASA 
12.  OSHA Regulations (Standards – 29 CFR 
1910.1200) Hazard Communication, May 25, 2012, 
US Department of Labor 
13. KCA-1645, Rev. Basic Agreement between The 
Department of Defense and The National Aeronautics 
& Space Administration Regarding Management of 
The Atlantic Missile Range of DoD and The Merritt 
Island Launch Area of NASA, Jan. 17, 1963, Florida 
Space Development Council Library 
14. NPR 8715.5A (change 2) Range Flight Safety 
Program, Sept. 12, 2012, NASA 
